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We show that asymmetric equilibria may exist in an ex ante 
symmetric step-by-step R&D race if product market competition 
is intense. The corresponding symmetric equilibrium is unstable 
and therefore less likely the one selected, while the asymmetric 
ones result in lower economic growth (reversing earlier results) but 
higher industry profits. Secondly, we show that the assumption 
of 'no leap-frogging' imbodied in the step-by-step structure of the 
model imposes no restrictions on the optimal strategies if and only 
if product market competition is small and imitation is easy. Both 
these results indicate that predictions or policy conclusions based 
on these models may have to be qualified.
.1EL classification: C73, 031
Keywords: Step-by-step R&D races, asymmetric equilibria, 
stability, leapfrogging
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We examine a model of technical progress that has been used as a build­
ing block in the ’Schumpeterian’ or endogenous growth literature, e.g. 
in Aghion, Harris and Vickers (AHV, 1997). It models non-drastic inno­
vation by strongly restricting the dynamics of competition: Innovations 
occur ’step-by-step’, which means that a firm that has fallen behind must 
first catch up and equalize with the leading firm before overtaking it. In 
particular, ’leapfrogging’ is ruled out by assumption. AHV analyze this 
model to give an example of a model of dynamic innovation competition 
where contrary to the results on drastic innovations "more intense prod­
uct market competition and/or imitations may be growth-enhancing”. 
They do this by comparing Bertrand and Cournot competition in the 
product market.
We elaborate on their model concerning two points: First, the au­
thors only analyze symmetric equilibria and show that there is a unique 
one. Their analysis does not reveal whether there are asymmetric equi­
libria as well, and whether the symmetric one is stable. In fact, these 
two points are connected, since in the presence of asymmetric equilibria 
the sole symmetric one is necessarily unstable.1 Stability of equilibrium 
is a desirable property for predictions or empirical applications, since 
the players will move away fast from unstable equilibria if there is the 
slightest amount of noise. We show that a pair of asymmetric equilibria 
arises under Bertrand competition in the output market if firms are very 
patient and imitation is difficult, while Cournot equilibrium is always sta­
ble. Where there is higher growth in the symmetric unstable Bertrand 
equilibrium than in the symmetric Cournot equilibrium, growth at the 
stable asymmetric equilibria is lower, reversing the conclusion that more 
competition in the product market leads to higher growth.
Second, we will discuss the assumption that firms cannot leapfrog 
the leaders and delineate the circumstances where firms would leapfrog
'Tliis is essentially an index-theoretic result, as was applied to Cournot oligopoly 



























































































in equilibrium if they had the possibility to do so. Leapfrogging in equi­
librium would occur under Bertrand competition, but may not occur 
under Cournot competition. Our analysis provides hints that traditional 
Schumpeterian leapfrogging models of drastic innovation are more appro­
priate if market competition is high, while the step-by-step assumption 
is justified when competition is less intense.
2 T he M odel
We will first describe the setup of the AHV model. Two duopolists with 
constant marginal cost compete in a market for a homogeneous product 
either in quantities or prices (Cournot or Bertrand competition, respec­
tively). Market demand has unit-elasticity, i.e. it is of the form p =  1 /Q,  
where Q is total output. Therefore if firms’ marginal costs are c; and c}, 
flow profits of firm i under Cournot competition are 7r‘ = 1/(1  + c,/cj)2, 
while with Bertrand competition they are r̂‘ =  inax{l — C;/Cj,0}.
Both firms conduct research to make cost-reducing innovations. 
These innovations reduce unit costs by a fixed factor 7  > 1, i.e. c( =  <7 / 7 , 
and arrive randomly and independently in continuous time with Poisson 
hazard rates determined by the research efforts of the two firms. A fun­
damental assumption of this model is that any firm can be maximally 
one step ahead: After a firm moves ahead it has to wait until the other 
one has caught up. This assumption can be justified by assuming that 
any further innovation would immediately disclose the last innovation to 
the other firm, so that in practice a new innovation does not change the 
cost gap. The possible states of competition are therefore S  =  { —1 , 0, 1 }, 
meaning that either firm i is behind, or firms are neck-to-neck, or firm i 
is in front.
Let firm i’s research efforts be (x. y) 6 R /, and firm j ’s (x, y) € K+. 
When firms are neck-to-neck their research efforts are x and x, and when 
they fall behind the efforts are y and y. Research is costly, with cost 
c(z) = z2/ 2. Catching up is easier than moving ahead: The hazard rate 




























































































ease of imitation. Market profit flows are given by 7Ti, no, and 7r_i, for 
a firm that is leading, neck-to-neck, or behind, respectively; r > 0 is the 
common discount factor. As in AHV, we will only be concerned with 
pure strategy equilibria in perfect Markov strategies, i.e. pure strategies 
that form a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game, and 
only depend on the state in {—1 , 0, 1} of the game.
Expected equilibrium payoffs are then characterized by the value 
functions
rVi =  TTt -  {y +  h) (Vi -  Vo),
rV0 = 7r0 -  c(x)+x(Vi -  Vo) ~ ^ (Vo -  V_i), (1)
rV- 1  =  n - i - c ( y )  + (y + h)(V0 -V- . i ) ,
where VJ, Vo, and VIi are the values of being ahead, neck-to-neck, and 
behind, respectively. For example, Vo, the value of being neck-to-neck, is 
determined as flow profits 7To minus costs of research c (x), plus the ex­
pected gain from innovating x  (V) — Vo), minus the expected loss caused 
by an innovation of the other firm, x (Vq — V-i). Given the strategy pair 
(x , y) of the other firm, the optimal strategies x  and y of a firm that 
is neck-to-neck or behind, respectively, have to satisfy the first order 
necessary conditions
c(:r) =  (V) -  V0) (2)
c (y)  = (Vh-VLj).
Taking pair-wise differences between the value functions (1) and inserting 
the first order conditions (2) we obtain the following system of equations 
characterizing the best responses (x.y) 6 b(x,y),  where b : R+ —» M2 
is the best response correspondence (let P  = nx — no and C = n\ — 7r.._ j 
describe the ”profit incentive'’ and ’’competitive threat” as in Beath et 
al. 1989. and s =  h + r):
\ x 2 + (y + s) x  -  xy = P, (3)
ly 2 — {x2 + (x + s ) y  = C — P.
Corresponding equations characterize x and y. Note that we explicitly 




























































































pairs, x  — x  and y = y, (3) are solved by AHV to yield the equilibrium 
strategies
x  =  \Js2 + 2P -  s, (4)
y = Vs2 + x2 + 2C  -  Vs2 + 2 P.
They also show that the growth rate of the economy if there are many 
identical sectors is given by
= 2x y + h
y H- ft -f 2a’
In 7 .
It can be shown that in asymmetric equilibria the average growth rate is 
given by
_  (x + x) (y  + h)(y + h)
(y + h +  x) (y + h + x) — xx  °  ̂ ’
3 A sym m etric Equilibria
In theory, (3) could be solved explicitly for (x,y) and {x, y), since it can 
be shown that these four equations can be ’reduced’ to four independent 
polynomial equations of order four, which still have analytical solutions. 
Instead, we will use the inverse response map (x, y) =  b~l (x. y), similar 
to Harris and Vickers (1987).
3.1 The Inverse B est Response
We will move in two steps. First, as we show in appendix 6.1 , note that 
the strategies used in any equilibrium are exactly the solutions to the 
fixed point equation (x . y ) G b(b(x,y)),  while strategies in symmetric 
equilibria make up the subset for which also (x, y) G b (x, y) holds. Sec­
ond, if b~l is the inverse of the best response, (x.y) G h (b (x. y)) if and 
only if (x, y) G b~x (ft1 (.r, y)), as shown in appendix 6.2. Therefore we can 
work with the inverse reaction map which in this case is more straightfor­
ward, and have the following: (x. y) G R* + is a strategy played in some 




























































































and only if (x, y) £ (b : )2 (x , y). It is part of some symmetric equilibrium 
if and only if (x, y) € b~* (x , y).
Best responses (x, y) =  b (x, y) in pure Markov strategies for the 
R&D-race are given by the equations (3). Under the natural assumptions 
that 7Ti > 7To (profits of a leader are strictly higher than those of a firm 
that is neck-to-neck), and 7To > 7r_ i ,  for any best response (x , y ) € R+ 
to (x, y) € we must have x > 0 and y > 0. i.e. (x ,y) € R2+. The 
inverse response map : R̂ _+ —> R2 is then given by solving (3) for x 
and y,
x  =  (C — P + x2/2 — j/2/2) / xj — s, (5)
y = {C -  y2/2 -  ys) /x  -  s.
Note that for large x or y the images x or y may be negative. This simply 
means that this (x,y) is not a best response to any feasible (i.e. non­
negative) strategy of the other firm. Therefore, (x, y) is a best response 
to some feasible strategy by the other firm if and only if 6_1 (x, y) > 0.
3.2 T he Graphical Solution
The fixed point condition on pure Markov perfect equilibrium strate­
gies, (x, y) £ (ft- 1 )2 (x, y), is still difficult to visualize, since (t>- 1 )2 is 
a map with a four-dimensional graph. The same is true for the fixed 
point condition on symmetric equilibria, (x, y) £ b~1(x, y). They can 
be ’solved’ numerically, but this is little intuitive, and also there is no 
guarantee that all solutions are found. We therefore propose a graphi­
cal solution where the fixed points can be visualized in two-dimensional 
space. Let F be cither one of the maps (6-1 )2 or b~1, and let F = (Fx, Fy), 
where FX,FXJ : R'̂ _ —► R+. That is, if F(x ,y)  =  (x,y), then Fx (x.y) = 
x, and Fy (x, y) = y. The fixed point condition (x, y) = F (x, y) can 
then be expressed equivalently by the two conditions x = Fx (x, y) and 
y = Fy (x, y). These describe two curves in R2 , and equilibrium strate­
gics can be found at their intersections. Denote by yfj. and the curves 
pertaining to F — />-1 (for symmetric equilibria), and by Ax and Ay the 




























































































Let us consider the cases of Cournot and Bertrand competition. Un­
der Cournot competition and unit-elasticity demand the profit function 
i s 7Ti =  l / ( l - f -  7 ~')2; with .s = 0.02 and 7  = 2 we obtain the following 
figure:
Figure 1: Equilibria under Cournot competition (s =  0.02, 7  =  2).
We can see that A2 and A2 meet at the same point as A\  and 
Ay, since ,4' and Ay describe the symmetric equilibria. Since A2 and 
A2, and also .4). and .4j. do not meet anywhere else, there is exactly 
one equilibrium, and it is symmetric (at x  «  0.604 and y «  0.392, with 
average growth rate g ~  0.209). This is the generic result under Cournot 
competition as we will argue below.
However, under Bertrand competition (n, = max{0.1 — 7  '}), also 




























































































Figure 2: Equilibria under Bertrand competition (s = 0.02, 7  =  2).
Here there is a pair of asymmetric equilibria (involving the strategy 
pairs (27, 2/1) «  (1.229,0.734) and (12, 1/2) ~  (0.643,0.156), and growth 
rate g «  0.140) and one symmetric equilibrium, with (x, y) ss (0.980, 
0.400) and growth rate g «  0.235. We can see that the existence of 
asymmetric equilibria depends on the relative slopes of the loci A 2 and A 2 
around the symmetric equilibrium: The example in Figure 3 (s =  0.15, 
7  =  2) shows that asymmetric equilibria may exist if and only if the 
slope of A2 is steeper than the slope of A'2 (in coordinates (1 , y)):
Figure 3: Equilibria under Bertrand competition (s =  0.15, 7  =  2).
We show in appendix 6.3 that the symmetric equilibrium with 




























































































under Bertrand competition is unstable if and only if (1 — 7 -1) /  (r +  h)2 
> K* ~  65.172, i.e. if the discount rate r and the ease of imitation h 
are sufficiently small. A large innovation size 7  makes instability more 
likely, but is in general not sufficient to cause instability.
3.3 W elfare Properties o f Asym m etric Equilibria
The existence of asymmetric equilibria under Bertrand competition has 
a straightforward interpretation: More relative advantage for the leader, 
either because the product market is more competitive (Bertrand instead 
of Cournot competition), or because cost reduction through innovations 
are bigger (7 higher), or because imitation is more difficult (lower h). or 
because players are patient and care about long-term advantage (lower 
r), may result in endogenous asymmetry. Ex ante identical firms choose 
different strategies because ’the market is too small’, and one of them 
emerges as a ’natural leader’, whereas the other becomes a ’natural fol­
lower’. Beliefs about each others’ strategies then reinforce the asymmetry 
even though there arc times when both firms are neck-to-neck and have 
the same cost of production, because they follow different investment 
strategies.
As argued above, considering the symmetric equilibrium as the ’’le­
gitimate solution” or even prediction of the game is questionable if it is 
unstable. Here the most reasonable prediction would be that the market 
ends up in one of the asymmetric equilibria, even if this is subject to the 
equilibrium selection problem. The comparison of payoffs and growth 
rates between symmetric and asymmetric equilibria is also of interest: 
It turns out that the (neck-to-neck) payoffs for the Bertrand example 
in Figure 2 are 28.39 and 1.525. whereas in the symmetric equilibrium 
they are 8.813 for each firm. Therefore, in the asymmetric equilibrium 
the follower’ is much worse off, but joint payoffs are higher than in the 
symmetric equilibrium. We were not able to prove this analytically, but 
suspect that this may hold generally: Since for the disadvantaged firm 
it is rational to hold back its efforts, there will be less dissipation of 




























































































On the other hand, average growth rates are higher in symmetric 
equilibria. The reason is that even though one of the firms credibly 
exerts very high research efforts when firms are neck-to-neck and when 
it is behind, since the other firm invests less in research in both cases, 
in equilibrium there will be fewer innovations, which lowers the growth 
rate. The decrease in growth rates, as the above example shows, can 
be so strong that conclusions about the relation between the intensity of 
competition in the product market and economic growth can be reversed.
This divergence between industry payoffs and economic growth, 
together with the instability of the symmetric equilibrium, may make 
asymmetry a welfare or even policy issue: The presence of a too ag­
gressive firm (even if the competitors are ex ante on equal footing) may 
effectively slow down growth, while keeping industry profits at a higher 
level. Therefore, higher competition in the product market will only be 
able to raise growth if the equilibrium if firms behave similarly in equi­
librium.
4 To leapfrog or not to  leapfrog
AHV assume that cost-reducing innovations are of a fixed size 7 , and 
that a firm that has fallen behind first has to catch up with the leader 
(make an innovation of size 7 ) instead of leapfrogging him (making an 
innovation of size 72). In this section we will discuss the equilibrium 
outcomes if leapfrogging is possible.
We will analyze whether in the present model ’no leapfrogging’ is 
an optimal choice if leapfrogging to the leader’s position is possible. In 
this case the assumption of 'no leapfrogging’ imposes no restriction on 
the equilibrium strategies.
We will assume that ’no leapfrogging’ is an equilibrium, with value 
functions as in (1) given bv
r\V =  i r i - ( y j + h ) ( W - V ) ,




























































































tU = 7T_i -  c(y.) +  {yj + h) (V -  Ü) ,
and first order conditions for optimal effort levels given as in (2) by
c'(xi) = ( W - V ) ,  
c'( Vi) =  ( v - D ) .
A follower who is deliberating to leap-frog faces the following value of 
leapfrogging (assuming that afterwards the equilibrium without leapfrog­
ging is played):
rUi = 7r_j -  c (2) +  (2 +  hi) (W  -  Ui) ,
where we assume that imitation is more difficult than for just catching 
up: 0 < hi < h. Research effort is 2 > 0, and at the optimum is 
characterized by the usual first order condition d  (2) =  (W — Ui). Using 
this first order conditions and solving2 for Ui leads to (assuming quadratic 
cost of research as above)
U = ;  (tt—j +  \ij2 + hy) ,
Ui = W  -  \J(hi +  r )2 +  2 (rW — 7r_x) +  (A, +  r ).
The follower prefers catching up over leapfrogging if U > U/. After some 
manipulations using the first order conditions, and because in equilibrium 
W  =  x  +  y +  U, this condition can be written as
x2 + 2xy + 2xhi + 2yhi < 2yh.
This can only hold if, in equilibrium, effort levels are very small and hi 
is small enough. A necessary condition for preferring catching up over 
leapfrogging is x 2 + 2xy < 2yh, which is independent of the value of 
hi. It can be shown that this condition is more likely to be satisfied if 
innovation size 7  is small or discount rate/ease of imitation s is large (and 
therefore x  and y are small), and an example for Cournot competition 
where catching up is preferred to leapfrogging is the equilibrium under




























































































the parameters 7  =  1.1, h =  0.2, and r  =  0.01. On the other hand, 
under Bertrand competition this condition never holds for any 7  > 1, and 
therefore firms prefer leapfrogging even if imitation is difficult, hi =  0, 
and therefore the ’equilibrium’ with catching up is never an equilibrium 
under Bertrand competition if we allow firms to leapfrog.
To sum up, if we relax the assumption that firms cannot leap­
frog, then no leapfrogging arises as an equilibrium outcome only when 
the intensity of competition in the product market is small (Cournot 
competition), and innovation size is small, or the discount rate and case 
of imitation are large.
5 Conclusion
For a simple model of step-by-step innovation competition we have shown 
that the unique symmetric equilibrium may be unstable if product market 
competition is high, innovations large, and discount rate and ease of 
innovation small. In this case asymmetric equilibria may exist as well, 
possibly altering the empirical predictions and welfare properties of this 
model.
We have also shown that the assumption that firms cannot leapfrog 
each other does restrict equilibrium strategies in the sense that firms 
would prefer to directly leapfrog each other unless market competition is 
low, innovations are small, and discount rate and ease of innovation are 
large.
6 A ppendix
6.1 Sym m etric and Asym m etric Equilibria
In a game with 2 players, strategy spaces S, ( 1  = 1,2) and given pure 
strategy best response maps b, : Sj —> S, (j  ^  i), the pure strategy 




























































































equations s; £ /); (Sj) (j ^  i). This leads to the necessary condition on 
an equilibrium strategy s,
s, 6 b, (ftj (s,)) ( j / * ) .  (6)
which does not depend on the strategy of firm j.  For identical best 
response maps b\ = b2 = b on Si =  S2, this condition becomes s, £ 
b (b (s,)) =  b2 (Si) (i =  1,2). Any s, with s, 6 b2 (Si) is part of some pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium (s,, s ,) since there is Sj £ b (s*) with Si € & (Sj), 
but of course not all combinations of with S; £ b2 (s,) (i = 1, 2)
are Nash equilibria (unless the game is zero-sum).
Also, Si with Si £ b (si) arc part of symmetric pure strategy equi­
libria (si, s2) with Sj =  .s2. It, is obvious that
{.s'i £ S)|a‘; G fi(s,)} C {s; G Sj|Sj € b2 (s,)} ,
i.e. symmetric equilibria are trivial ’asymmetric’ equilibria. Strategies 
appearing as part of (non-trivial) asymmetric pure strategy equilibria are 
therefore given by
{s, G Si|Si G b2 (Si) A s, $ fi(s,)} .
These conditions are illustrated in the context of the following static 
game: There are two players with strategy sets S\ = S2 = [0,1], and 
payoffs are s,- (s  ̂ — l )2 — sf/2 (i = 1,2;i ^  j). Best responses are found 
to be single-valued with b(sj) = (Sj — l)2, and the pure strategies in 
equilibrium are given as the solutions (over [0, 1]) of the following equa­
tions
symmetric : s, =  (si — l )2 => s, =  |  — |\/5 ,
(a)synunetric : s, - {(si -  l )2 — l) => s, G jo, |  — |\ /5 ,  l | .
The pure strategy Nash equilibria are therefore (0,1), (1,0), and ( |  — 




























































































6.2 T he inverse best-response map
Above we argued that to find the set of all pure equilibrium strategies 
we can work with the inverse response map instead of the response map 
itself. To this end we prove the following lemma:
Lem m a 1 The sets of fixed points of h2 : R+ —♦ M2 and of (ft-1 )2 : 
R^+ —+ R2 are identical:
{{x ,y) \ (x ,y)  € b2(x,y)} =  {(x ,y )  | (x,y) G (b-1)2 (x ,y ) j .
Proof. Extend b~l to the whole of R2 by defining b l (x, y) = 0 if (x, y) 6 
R2\R++, and define b~l (0) =  0. Let (x, y) be such that (x , y) G b2 (x, y)\ 
then there is (x,y) G R2+ such that (x, y) G b(x,y), (x,y) G b(x,ij), and 
therefore (x,y)  € R 2+. Then it is obvious that (x,y) G b } (x. y) and 
(x,y) G 6_1 (x , y ), therefore (x,y) G (b~1)2 (x,y).
For the converse, let (x,y) G (6-1 )2 (x, y). Then there is (x,y) G 
ft-1 (x, y)nR^.+ such that (x, y) G b~l (x, y), otherwise (6_1) (x, y) would 
be empty. Therefore (x, y) G b(x,y) and (x,y) G b(x,y),  i.e. (x, y) G 
b2 (x, y). m
6.3 Stability
In this appendix we will give a precise definition of what we mean by ’’sta­
bility” of an equilibrium in this game where each player has two strategies 
instead of only one, and derive a necessary and sufficient condition for 
stability of the symmetric equilibria of this model.
Let Db and Db~l be the (2x2) Jacobians of the best response and 
inverse best response maps, respectively. Then we say that an equilib­
rium is stable if the absolute values of the (real parts of the) eigenvalues 
of Db at this equilibrium are strictly smaller than 1, or equivalently, if 
the absolute values of the (real parts of the) eigenvalues of D b ' 1 at this 
equilibrium are strictly larger than 1. This definition is the natural gener­




























































































for two-player games with one-dimensional strategies as e.g. in Seade 
(1980).
We will make use of the inverse response map, with
Db 1 (x , y)
x
y
1 2sy - 2C + y2
2 x 2





x 2 — .sy—y2+ y / (x ‘l +y2x 2+.s'2y'2 — 4(?sy+4C2+ 4P sy—4PC + 2Py2+2x2C) 
2xy
x* — sy—y 1 — y j  (x4-\-y2x 2+s2y2 — 4Ctiy+4C2+4P9y—4PC + 2Py2+2x2C) 
2xy
After substituting the symmetric equilibrium solution (4), the larger 
eigenvalue eq is always positive and larger than 1 , while the smaller eigen­
value is negative and may fall in the interval [—1 , 0], which happens if 
and only if C js 2 =  C/  (r +  h)2 is larger than the positive root K  (if it 
exists) of the equation
16 (A +  l )2 (5A -  4)2 A'4 + (192 -  352A3 -  944A2 -  2992A) K\7)  
-  (568A2 +  2888A + 1404) A'2 -  (1252 + 712A) K  -  267 =  0,
where A =  P/C.  With Bertrand competition, A =  1 because C  =  P 
=  1 — 7 “ 1, and the positive solution of (7) is K  ~  65.172. Therefore 
the symmetric equilibrium with Bertrand competition is unstable if and 
only if (1 — 7 _1) /  (?• + h)2 > K  «  65.172. By continuity of the reaction 
maps, and given that
On the other hand, e2 is always smaller than — 1 if 0 < A < 4/5, for 
which (7) does not have a positive solution. With Cournot competition, 
C = and P =  1 l3/ t i .KT,~U an(j p  < iQ  js true for all 7  > 1.
1+7  4 ( I + 7 ) 2 5
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